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Abstract:  
 
The issue of recognition of contractual rights as protected investments in international 
investment arbitration, primarily under the auspices of ICSID, has sparked divergent 
approaches in case law. Treatment of certain contracts and the criteria used differ, which 
leads to unwelcome consequence of lowering legal certainty in a very sensitive issue. The aim 
of this paper is to contribute to enhancement and clarification of legal reasoning in this area, 
with a special focus on the criteria to be used and on sales contracts which are particularly 
controversial in practice. This is done through the analysis of the current state of affairs 
which is followed by a proposition of a new model of criteria which could present a beneficial 
compromise between the existing models and increase certainty. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
The issue of what can be recognized as an investment and given the corresponding 
protection under the rules of international investment law is both long lasting and 
highly contentious. While categories of investments which can be deemed ‘easily 
recognizable’ do exist, they only form a (relatively) stable core of the term. Its outer 
limits are far from settled. 
Contractual rights are a good example of the shifting boundaries of investment 
protection. Historically, the recognition of possibility of international law regime to 
deal with contracts including private entities, started with the Serbian Loans case of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929,1 was an impetus that 
eventually grew to creation of investment dispute settlement mechanisms we 
recognize today.2 Even before that, Permanent Court of Arbitration recognized the 
possibility to expropriate contractual rights as assets in Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Claims case.3  
Despite widespread contemporary acceptance of intangible assets (and indeed 
contractual rights) as protected investments in international investment law, the key 
question - which contractual rights are to be protected? - is not decisively settled. 
Actual examples from the practice of investment protection offer intriguing 
examples of dilemmas that need to be solved – is commercialization of tobacco 
products a form of investment? What about contracts for retrieving shipwrecked 
artefacts and selling them later? Or maybe expenditures made prior to actually 
obtaining a contract with a host state? The debate about these issues is, of course, far 
from a purely academic one. Recognizing that a certain contractual right (or as is 
commonly abbreviated, ‘contract’) is a protected investment can mean a world of 
difference for a foreign investor in terms of available protection. It can mean a 
difference between litigating in a possibly slow and/or biased court system of a host 
State and having recourse to arbitral proceedings before a specialised and well-
known international institution such as International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The topic of this paper is to contribute to 
enhancement and clarification of legal reasoning in this area, with a special focus on 
the criteria to be used and also on sales contracts, a category which is particularly 
controversial in practice. 
The discussion ahead consists of three parts. The first part deals with the general 
issues of recognizing a contract as a protected ‘investment’ and also explores the 
broader issue of the criteria used to recognize protected investments in international 
investment arbitration and the proposed future model of recognizing investments. 
The second part is focused on sales contracts, their current status and the potential 
use of the suggested model when facing the issue if a particular sales contract is an 
investment or not. The third part proposes certain guidelines for the future 
regarding the discussed issues. These guidelines are based on the conclusions 
reached in previous parts. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France v Yugoslavia), PCIJ Rep Series No 20. 
2 Thomas Wälde, ‘The Serbian Loans Case: A Precedent for Investment Treaty Protection of Foreign 
Debt?’ in Todd Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May 2005) 393. 
3 Permanent Court of Arbitration Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Award,13 October 1922) 1 RIAA 
307. See also August Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph 
Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 411-412. 
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2. RECOGNITION OF CONTRACTS AS INVESTMENTS 
 
2.1 General Remarks 
 
Contractual rights are often present in investment disputes. This is in accordance 
with the general trend of the changing nature of investments, which is evolving 
from the old natural resource exploitation and ownership of production facilities to 
more modern forms, such as service agreements.4  
It is possible to make a list of commonly encountered forms of contract. The types of 
contracts usually considered as having a character of investment in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) when listed, ICSID practice and doctrinal writings are: 
construction, turnkey, management/service, production, profit-sharing, leasing, 
technology/know-how transfer, and joint-venture contracts.5 Other important 
contracts are public concession agreements, but one should bear in mind that they 
by their nature include the host State and thus generally pose no particular problems 
in being identified as protected by international investment law. Some authors 
include loans in the group of protected contracts,6 which is technically true (loans 
are, of course, contracts), but they are usually classified as a separate group of 
investments along with other financial instruments.  
But the above is merely an informative list, a recapitulation of what can be found in 
legal instruments and case law. The key issue is not just to identify these contracts. 
The crucial question is why are these contracts recognized? Only if the criteria which 
led to this are known and understood properly it can be said that there will be 
enough predictability to ascertain if in a future case a contractual right is likely to be 
recognized as an investment. And at this point the analysis necessarily becomes 
somewhat broader. 
 The criteria proposed for recognizing contractual rights cannot be separated from 
the criteria which will be used in general to evaluate if there is an investment. 
Despite certain specificities (some will be suggested in the section dealing with sales 
contracts) the underlying core criteria will necessarily be the same for different types 
of investments. Thus, examining what these criteria are and how the overall 
approach can be improved has a wider relevance for the notion of ‘investment’ in 
international investment law. Of course, due effort will be made to frame the 
findings and conclusions within the context of contractual rights as much as 
possible.  
   
                                                 
4 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, CUP 
2010) 11-6. 
5 Cristoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (CUP 2001) 138-139; United States 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2012 < 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf > accessed 13 May 2012 (US Model BIT 
2012) art 1; Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) 102; John P. Given, ‘Malaysia Historical 
Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Malaysia: An End to the Liberal Definition of “Investment” in ICSID 
Arbitrations?’ 31 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review (2009) 467, 475; 
Prabhash Ranjan, ‘Definition of Investment in Bilateral Investment Treaties of South Asian Countries 
and Regulatory Discretion’ 26 Journal of International Arbitration 219, 225. See also OECD, The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 11 
(MAI) ch 2, art 2. 
6 Given (n 5) 475-6. 
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 2.2 Current Criteria for Recognition 
 
Two preliminary notes should be made. Firstly, it is not the author’s objective to try 
and ascertain criteria which led to recognition of certain contracts or other 
transactions as investments in particular BITs. Bearing in mind their vast number 
and a plethora of circumstances which might influence specific definitions in 
particular BITs, such task is indeed out of the scope of this paper. What can be said 
is that developments in practice do influence BITs and definitions therein, but such 
influence always has to be examined on a case-by-case basis.  
Secondly, the discussion that follows is primarily centred on establishing ICSID 
jurisdiction and problems with the notion of ‘investment’ found in Article 25 of the 
Washington Convention.7 One reason for this is that ICSID is (in terms of caseload 
and dispute values) the most important forum for resolving investment disputes.8 
The second one is that this sensitive area is currently marred by divergent 
jurisprudence.  
Regarding non-ICSID arbitral tribunals, generally speaking two different situations 
can exist. In some cases the issues discussed are not so prominent, as there might be 
no need to deal with Article 25 and parties are generally free to arbitrate about 
whatever they agree upon (subject, of course, to potentially mandatory rules on 
arbitrability and similar provisions). In such cases the jurisdiction can be established, 
for example, merely by interpreting the BIT, which would be the only step that 
needs to be taken when establishing jurisdiction. In other situations, most 
prominently NAFTA cases, the situation might again revolve around establishing an 
objective meaning of the term ‘investment’. In such cases, it is legitimate to ask 
whether or not the discussion of ICSID cases and jurisprudence formed therein 
might be of influence or even of precedential value? Regarding NAFTA, it can be 
said that there is a growing tendency to look upon investment treaty arbitration and 
awards made as a single phenomenon and not to insist on differences between 
jurisdictions.9 Decisions of arbitral tribunals dealing with alleged breaches of 
NAFTA provisions confirm the tendency to give due consideration and careful 
examination to previous ICSID awards as well.10 Bearing this in mind, it can be said 
that the discussion that follows can also be of wider (non-ICSID) relevance.  
The starting point for dealing with the issues of ICSID jurisdiction is Article 25(1) 
of the ICSID Convention, which states:  
 
                                                 
7 The Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 
(1965) 159 (The ICSID Convention). 
8 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson and Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International 2010) 7-8; Jan Peter Sasse, An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(Gabler Verlag 2011) 59. 
9 See Jeffery P. Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration – A Citation Analysis of a 
Developing Jurisprudence’ (2007) 24(2) Journal of International Arbitration 129. 
10 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Arbitration (Award, 12 January 2011), 
<http://www.arbitrationlaw.com/files/free_pdfs/Grand%20River%20v%20US%20-%20Award.pdf> 
accessed 15 May 2012, para. 61; The Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States of America, 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Arbitration (Award on Jurisdiction, 28 January 2008), 
<http://italaw.com/documents/CCFT-USAAward_000.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012, paras 49-51. 
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The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to 
the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre … 
The term ‘investment’ (unlike ‘national’, for example) is not defined in further text. 
Despite some differing opinions, it is commonly considered that this was not caused 
by a mere lack of agreement, but was an intentional compromise.11  
However, this led to a situation in which it was not clear what role the term was 
supposed to play and what was its inherent meaning, if it had one in the first place. 
To fully understand the possible approaches to this issue, one should remember that 
‘investments’ (including contractual rights or not) are already defined in BITs. What 
has not been settled so far is if this definition of, for example, a contractual right as 
an investment found in a BIT is also the one relevant for Article 25(1) (which would 
mean that Article 25 term has no inherent, objective meaning) or this definition only 
constitutes consent as required by Article 25(1) while ‘investment’ presents a separate 
jurisdictional hurdle. The debate became even more complicated because of differing 
opinions in case-law how is this objective, inherent meaning of ‘investment’ to be 
established if the tribunal considers it to indeed exist.  
The case-law dealing with these problems is substantial and diverse. It is not 
possible within the scope of this work to go into all the interesting factual or 
theoretical subtleties of particular cases. What is possible is to rationalize the 
general approaches of various tribunals into three groups: a) ‘deference to consent’; 
b) ‘benchmark’; and c) ‘cumulative’ group. In essence, all these approaches are 
located along the line which starts at total subjectivity and deference to consent, and 
ends at the strictly objective approach with the need for cumulative fulfilment of 
additional (varying) objective preconditions in a manner resembling a checklist.  
Decisions in the first group12 practically equate consent and investment – if the BIT 
proclaims something to be an investment, this should suffice for all purposes of 
Article 25(1). The other two groups of decisions share a different starting premise – 
there is something more in Article 25(1) that needs to be fulfilled and that is the 
requirement of ‘investment’ which should be ascertained by some objective criteria.  
                                                 
11 Engela C. Schlemmer, ‘Investment, Investor, Nationality, and Shareholders’, in Peter Muchlinski, 
Federico Ortino and Cristoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
(OUP 2008) 49, 62-3; Julian D. Mortenson, ‘The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the 
Domain of International Investment Law’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 257, 280ff. 
12 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
December 2003) 43 ILM (2004) 262; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004) 
<http://www.asil.org/ilib/Enron.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport 
Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25 (Award, 16 August 
2007) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/FraportAward.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012; Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22 (Award, 24 July 
2008) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC1589_En&caseId=C67> accessed 15 May 2012. Generally, also in: Pantechniki S.A. 
Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21 (Award, 30 July 2009) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC1133_En&caseId=C113> accessed 15 May 2012. 
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Reasoning based on objective criteria is usually considered to have originated in 
Fedax v. Venezuela.13 It seems that in early ICSID cases the tribunals were not much 
willing to deliberate about the issue.14 The Fedax tribunal turned to the writings of 
Professor Schreuer and concluded that the basic features of investment (for Article 
25(1) purposes) were a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, 
assumption of risk, a substantial commitment, and significance for the host State’s 
development.15 These criteria were followed by the tribunal in the Salini v. Morocco16 
case (giving the name to the so-called Salini test), with the exception of the need for 
certain regularity of profit and return, while also noting the need to assess all these 
criteria globally, in light of their interdependence.17  
However, variations that developed in this general approach are not irrelevant. 
Cases in the ‘benchmark’ group18 suggest that the presence of certain criteria is 
providing only exemplary guidance for the tribunal - ‘benchmarks or yardsticks’19 to 
help the tribunal in deciding, while it stays as flexible as possible. Cases in the 
‘cumulative’ group state the requirement that all the criteria need to be present in 
order to find an investment – but they disagree on what these criteria are. Cases in 
this group revolve around the Salini test, but the number of criteria is either three 
(Salini test minus ‘contribution to the host State‘criterion),20 four,21 five (adding back 
                                                 
13 Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997) 37 ILM (1998) 1378. 
14 Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (OUP 2007) 169-170; Reed, Paulsson and Blackaby (n 8) 68. 
15 Fedax v. Venezuela (n 13) para. 43. 
16 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 
(Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001) 42 ILM (2003) 609. 
17 Ibid., para 52. The Salini v. Morocco dispute arose out of claims which two Italian companies, Salini 
and Italstrade, had against a Moroccan entity (ADM) financed by the Moroccan government 
regarding the construction of highways for which these companies where contracted by ADM. 
Moroccan government, inter alia, tried to negate the definition of contractual rights (which these 
companies had) as investments for ICSID purposes, which was eventually rejected by the tribunal. 
Salini criteria as described above were defined in the process. 
18 Československa obchodní banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4 (Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999) 14 ICSID Review (1999) 251; MCI Power Group LC and 
New Turbine v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6 (Award, 31 July 2007) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MCIEcuador.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012; RSM Production 
Corporation v. Grenada, ICSID Case No ARB/05/14 (Award, 13 March 2009) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/RSMvGrenadaAward.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012.  
19 RSM v. Grenada (n 18) para. 241. 
20 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC523_En&caseId=C27> accessed 15 May 2012; LESI, S.p.A. and Astaldi, S.p.A. v. People's 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 July 2006) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC528_Fr&caseId=C48> accessed 15 May 2012; Víctor Pey Casado and President Allende 
Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/ 98/2 (Award, 8 May 2008) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Peyaward.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012; Saba Fakes v. Republic of 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20 (Award, 14 July 2009) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Fakes_v_Turkey_Award.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012; For a non-
ICSID case, see Romak S.A. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280 (Award, 26 
November 2009) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ROMAK-
UZBEKISTANAward26November2009.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012. 
21 Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/13 (Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 June 2006) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/JandeNuljurisdiction061606.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012. 
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the ‘regularity of profit and return’ criterion)22 or even six (adding legality and good 
faith to the Salini criteria).23  
It is not hard to see that such a confusing state of jurisprudence is seriously 
infringing the predictability of outcomes and thus also legal certainty. In the end, 
achieving investment protection before ICSID for a potentially high value contract 
might depend on the doctrinal inclinations of the arbitral tribunal, and not on settled 
legal principles. Therefore, it is submitted that there should be a single approach in 
determining jurisdiction, and in the author’s opinion that approach should be an 
objective, semi-cumulative, three criteria test that will be elaborated below. As a side 
note, one should be aware that the lack of formal binding precedent doctrine in 
ICSID arbitration might be an obstacle to ever achieving totally unified approach. 
However, with the attitude that was exhibited, for example, by the Bayndir and Saba 
Fakes tribunals and which endorses following established and consistent case-law in 
comparable situations,24 homogeneity of case law can be largely achieved. Such 
development are already noted and supported in doctrine.25 
  
2.3 The Proposed Model 
 
It is first necessary to see why the approach should not be based on the total 
deference to consent. It might seem that such an approach has some compelling 
arguments to support it. Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention simply speaks of 
disputes arising out of an investment without further qualifications about an 
investment. Article 25 (4) sanctions the freedom of the contracting State to exclude 
whole classes of disputes from their consent to jurisdiction and thus clearly confirms 
the principle of party autonomy. On the basis of such premises, it is not easy to see 
why then the parties should not be absolutely free to define what an investment is. If 
contracting States have a strong interest in giving BIT/ICSID arbitration 
protection to a particular form of transaction, should Article 25 stand in their way? 
If such protection is under the circumstances important for the economic 
development of a certain country (for example, as a tool to attract particular foreign 
businesses) would that not mean that Article 25 would contravene the Preamble of 
the Convention (which sets economic development as a primary goal) and undermine 
                                                 
22 Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11 (Award, 6 
August 2004) 19 ICSID Review (2004) 486; Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 October 2006) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC773_En&caseId=C64> accessed 15 May 2012. 
23 Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5 (Award, 15 April 2009) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC1033_En&caseId=C74> accessed 15 May 2012. 
24 See Saba Fakes v. Turkey (n 20) para 96. 
25 Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante’, UC 
Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 158 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319834> accessed 15 May 
2012, 266-267; Cristoph Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in 
Investment Arbitration’, (2006) 3 Transnational Dispute Management 10, 14; Jan Paulsson, 
‘International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International 
Law’, (Provisional Issue September 2006) Transnational Dispute Management 13; Thomas W. 
Wälde, ‘The Present State of Research Carried Out By the English-Speaking Section of the Centre for 
Studies and Research’, in New Aspects of International Investment Law (Brill 2006) 140ff; Alexis C. 
Brown, ‘Presumption Meets Reality’, (2001) 16 American University International Law Review  
1013; Tai-Heng Cheng, ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2007) 30 
Fordham International Law Journal 1048-1050. 
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its aims? In light of such questions, it can be seen why some tribunals accepted total 
deference to parties consent or why, for example, Professor Mortenson suggests that 
whatever parties considered an investment, as long as it is ‘colorably economic’, 
should be considered to be an investment for the purposes of Article 25.26  
But this simply cannot stand. While it is true that establishing whether or not a 
certain transactions falls within what the parties agreed is an investment is a 
necessary condition of establishing ICSID jurisdiction, it should not be a sufficient 
condition. Two main arguments speak against unrestricted deference. Firstly, this 
would mean that the term ‘investment’ does not have and can never have any 
inherent meaning for the purposes of an institution intentionally created to deal with 
investments. Although one can accept that legal and economic definitions of an 
investment may differ, this cannot mean that they differ so much that former is 
actually tabula rasa to be written by the Contracting States over and over again 
while the latter has well-known (albeit sometimes blurry) borders. Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention did not create ICSID in order to resolve all sorts of 
‘economic’ or ’business’ disputes, but only ‘investment’ disputes. This is not to say 
that creating a new, wide reaching dispute resolution centre aimed at ‘business’ 
disputes in general would be illegitimate or unwarranted, but simply that it is not 
what ICSID is. Trying to ‘transform’ it to something through (the lack of) 
jurisdictional thresholds should thus be prevented.  
Secondly, one should consider what would be the practical consequences of accepting 
unrestricted deference. Wide acceptance of economic activities as investments could 
lead to many transitory and fringe activities suddenly becoming investments.27 This 
would potentially (or even likely) lead to the opening of the floodgates and 
undesirable massive increase in investment litigation. As the trend of increase in 
cases is already a constant in international investment arbitration, pushing the 
process even more could easily lead to the system becoming hopelessly 
overstretched and, ultimately, inefficient. 
In conclusion, establishing if a transaction is an investment for the purposes of a 
relevant BIT is essential to establish if there is the consent required by the Article 
25(1) but not more than that. In order to find this consent, a tribunal needs to 
interpret the relevant BIT in accordance with the rules of public international law 
and the circumstances of the particular case, but this analysis remains separate from 
finding of an ‘investment’ for the purposes of Article 25. 
It is thus necessary to turn to establishing the inherent meaning of that term. It is 
common ground that certain criteria need to be established in order to ‘fill’ the term 
‘investment’ with some meaning. Two key issues must be resolved: first, what these 
criteria should be and second, how one should characterize their nature and mutual 
interdependence. 
As for the number and contents of the criteria to be applied, as seen above, the Salini 
test is the starting point. However, before dealing with the problem of the actual 
variant of the test that would be preferable, one can question whether the Salini 
criteria are to be taken as a starting point at all. Indeed, there are serious conceptual 
objections to the Salini test, specifically that it is ideologically coloured and also 
                                                 
26 Mortenson (n 11) 315. 
27 See Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) 163-164. 
 VOLUME 5  EJLS    ISSUE 1 
 
 152 
unsuitable to comprise portfolio28 investments.29 It would be quite legitimate to 
propose a new, maybe more appropriate test. Still, it is submitted that Salini should 
be a viable starting point. It is widely (albeit somewhat differently) applied in the 
case-law, which makes it an obvious choice for creating and maintaining a line of 
consistent jurisprudence. In addition to that, in the author’s opinion, criteria of 
duration, contribution and risk really do form a core of what should be expected 
from an investment.  
However, this is not the case with the other criteria sometimes proposed. Criteria of 
legality and good faith, mentioned above, cannot be reconciled with Article 25(1) and 
should be rejected for reasons well explained in case law.30 Regularity of profit and 
return also seem inadequate as a criterion. If this regularity must be achieved, than 
this is an unjustifiably high threshold, as the foreign investor is left without 
protection if its investment failed for commercial reasons, and that should not be 
relevant in this context. And if it is expected regularity, then this can easily be 
assimilated with the criterion of risk.  
But the situation is not so clear regarding the criterion of host State development. 
This criterion has strong proponents, some going so far as to consider it a ‘crucial’ 
one.31 Yet, it should be rejected. It is inherently open to different interpretations and 
also subject to so much (substantiated) criticism that it can hardly play a meaningful 
role. Some respected scholars are clearly against the idea of the need to show any 
particular contribution to the host State apart from general benefits that investments 
usually bring.32 The term itself is very vague. Even if the discussion is limited to just 
economic development, as opposed to broad notion of ‘development’, an arbitral 
tribunal will face itself with numerous possible definitions of what ‘economic 
development’ actually is.33  
There are also other problems related to this criterion. There is no agreement 
whether this contribution needs to be ‘significant’ or not. Or how is it supposed to be 
measured – by the increase of the GDP of the host State, or somehow differently. All 
these difficult issues were put forward before arbitral tribunals and, regrettably, 
received different answers.34 Not to mention how much more complicated the 
landscape would become if human rights and similar non-economic variables were 
also included into the notion of development.35 Finally, as some arbitral tribunals 
                                                 
28 Portfolio investments comprise investments constituted out of acquiring and ownership of shares in 
a foreign company without the aim of managing that company. See Sornarajah (n 4) 8-10. 
29 See, for example, Devanish Krishan, ‘A Notion of ICSID Investment’, in Todd Weiler (ed), 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (Vol. 1, JurisNet LLC 2008) 61.  
30 Saba Fakes v. Turkey (n 20) para 112.  
31 Amazu A. Asouzu, International Commercial Arbitration and African States – Practice, 
Participation and Institutional Development (CUP 2004) 263. 
32 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’, 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2000) 469, 492. 
33 Ignacio D’Alessio, ‘A Comment on ICSID’s jurisdictional issues: Problems, Solutions and 
Recommendations for a Better Understanding in International Commercial Relations’ (Research 
Paper, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153988> accessed 15 May 
2012, 35. 
34 Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Definition of “Investment”: An Open-ended Search for a Balanced Approach’, 
in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to 
the Key Issues (OUP 2010) 243, 259-261. 
35 Marek Jezewski, ‘There is No Freedom without Solidarity: Towards a New Definition of 
Investment in International Economic Law’ Working Paper No. 51/08, SIEL Inaugural Conference 
Online Proceedings <http://www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural-Conference.html> accessed 15 
May 2012, 1, 12ff. 
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aptly noted, this criterion is not only difficult to establish but is practically covered 
by the remaining three,36 leaving the arbitral tribunals prone to confuse it with other 
criteria.37  
Unfortunately, the issue remains hotly contested in arbitral practice, as illustrated 
by the decisions of the annulment committees in Malaysia Historical Salvors38 
(arguing for non-jurisdictional and flexible character of this criterion) and Patrick 
Mitchell39 (arguing for essentiality of this criterion).40 Dissenting opinion of judge 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen in Malaysia Historical Salvors, for example, offers a good 
illustration of differing positions accepted on this point by developed and developing 
states.41  
Although ‘development’ is the aim stated in the ICSID Convention Preamble, it is 
submitted that transforming an (optimistic and diplomatic) wording found there into 
any sort of jurisdictional requirement is not just unusual, but also unwarranted and 
excessively troublesome. The Preamble remains a useful tool for interpretation and 
for establishing the aims of the Convention. But these aims are quite sufficiently 
advanced by applying the remaining three Salini criteria. Thus, regarding the 
objective criteria to be used, the first three Salini criteria (contribution, certain 
duration and an element of risk) are the foundation that is needed.  
This leads us to the second crucial issue. In the light of the existing jurisprudence, it 
seems necessary to decide if these three criteria are to be simply ‘benchmarks and 
yardsticks’ or their presence needs to be established in each and every case.  
It is submitted that if the three above mentioned criteria are accepted as the core of 
what constitutes an investment, then the tribunal should not treat them as mere 
guiding examples. These criteria should be present in every case. But this does not 
mean that the tribunals should drift into an overly strict approach and impose some 
general minimum ‘quantities’ of each of the criteria that must always be present. It 
should be borne in mind, for example, that the very author whose writings were the 
source of the criteria, Professor Schreuer, warned and criticized against accepting 
these general features of investment as a strict jurisdictional test.42  
What the tribunal should do is that it should be attentive to what the Salini v. 
Morocco tribunal stated in addition to setting out the test, and that is the need to 
interpret the criteria in totality and having regard to the circumstances of a 
particular case. The tribunal should not be able to find the existence of an 
investment if one element is lacking. It is truly hard to argue, for example, that a 
                                                 
36 LESI v. Algeria (n 20) para. 72; Bayindir v. Pakistan (n 20) para. 137. 
37 Given (n 5) 487. 
38 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10 (Decision on 
the Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC1030_En&caseId=C247> accessed 15 May 2012.  
39 Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7 (Decision on the 
Application for the Annulment of the Award, 1 November 2006) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012. 
40 For more on this issue see Yannaca-Small (n 34) 259-61. 
41 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, 19 February 2009) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC1031_En&caseId=C247> accessed 15 May 2012. 
42 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (n 5) 140. 
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contract of negligible duration can seriously be considered an investment. On the 
other hand, what the tribunal should be free to do is to conduct a balancing exercise. 
It should be free, while taking into account all the circumstances of the case, to 
decide what extent of fulfilment of each of the criteria is enough.  
In the author’s opinion, this precludes prescriptive statements such as that 
investment must have a minimum duration of a certain number of years or any 
similar ‘quantification’ of investments. Such requirements, that to some extent 
resemble a Procrustean bed, simply cannot be reconciled with the flexible approach 
which is needed. Additionally, one should also bear in mind that one similar 
‘quantification’ threshold for an investment to exist (in the form of minimum value) 
was explicitly rejected during the drafting of the ICSID Convention.43 
In summary, a foreign investor seeking to protect his contractual rights as 
investments before an ICSID should expect two distinct steps in proving that 
jurisdictional thresholds are met. The first step is establishing that its contractual 
right is covered by the relevant BIT. Generally, because of the usually broad 
wording used in BITs, this should not prove to be excessively hard in most cases 
(some potential issues will be mentioned below when discussing sales contracts). 
After this step, which establishes consent for the purpose of Article 25, the investor 
should prove the fulfilment of three criteria – certain duration, contribution and 
existence of risk, as to fulfil the quintessential conditions for the existence of an 
‘investment’ within the meaning of Article 25(1).  
When deliberating about this issue, the tribunal should decisively determine the 
existence of all three criteria, but it should be flexible in assessing the extent to 
which these need to be fulfilled. The tribunal should take into account all the 
relevant circumstances of the particular case, with potential diversity of these not 
permitting any all encompassing or very specific guidance. If the contract in 
question is one already recognized in case law as constituting an investment, this 
should provide a useful guidance and also support the investor’s case, but that fact 
alone should not be decisive. Even if one supports the development of harmonious 
ICSID jurisprudence, this should not come at the expense of doing justice to the 
facts of each particular case.  
It can be predicted that in most cases what the States envisaged in a BIT as an 
investment, and what can be an investment for the purposes of Article 25 will 
coincide.44 But not always, and the following section offers a good illustration. 
 
3. SALES CONTRACTS 
 
3.1 General Remarks 
 
As can be concluded from above, adding new types of contract to the list of usually 
recognized investments should not be considered to be a finished process. One can 
be even less sure if a particular contract will be recognized as an investment in 
individual cases with potentially very differing circumstances. Yet, in contrast to this 
assertion, there seems to be a widespread trend in legal instruments and 
                                                 
43 Mortenson (n 11) 297-298. 
44 Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/11 (Award, 1 December 2010) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&do
cId=DC1771_En&caseId=C660> accessed 15 May 2012, para. 44. 
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jurisprudence that ordinary commercial contracts, primarily contracts of sale, cannot 
fall within the definition of investment.45 This trend is largely supported by 
doctrinal writings as authors emphasize these contracts as examples of what would 
usually fall out of the scope of protection when discussing definitions of investments 
in various instruments and for various purposes.46  
It is submitted that such assertions should be taken with caution and that this 
general proposition should not be considered valid in all situations. The ratio behind 
it certainly has merit, in that it aims to prevent unwarranted and highly undesirable 
stretching of investment protection too far. However, it can be argued that there are 
situations in which what might be perceived as a sales contract should be recognized 
to be an investment, mainly due to its close relation with a previous investment 
already made.  
It should also be said that the term ‘sales contracts’ is here used as a generic term to 
denote all kinds of trading arrangements which have as their key feature exchange of 
goods for payment, as opposed to various types of services/labour/production 
arrangements. In the author’s opinion, this group can offer a good view as how the 
term ‘investment’ can and should continue to evolve. 
An excellent illustration of the general trend of exclusion of sales contracts is 
provided by the Global Trading and Globex v. Ukraine case. The tribunal, after 
resorting to previous ICSID decisions, concluded that pure commercial transactions, 
such as simple purchase and sale contracts, cannot be considered as investments for 
the purpose of Article 25.47 As for the transactions in question in that particular case, 
which were rather typical trans-boundary CIF sales, the tribunal stated:  
 
… these are each individual contracts, of limited duration, for the purchase and 
sale of goods, on a commercial basis and under normal CIF trading terms, and 
which provide for delivery, the transfer of title, and final payment, before the 
goods are cleared for import into the recipient territory; and that neither 
contracts of that kind, nor the moneys expended by the supplier in financing its 
part in their performance, can by any reasonable process of interpretation be 
construed to be ‘investments’ for the purposes of the ICSID Convention.48  
 
Another example is the often cited non-ICSID case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic,49 
centred on the sale of gas condensate under the ECT. In that case, as is suggested, 
                                                 
45 North American Free Trade Agreement (The NAFTA) (signed on 17 December 1992, entered into 
force 1 January 1994) 32 ILM (1993) 289 (Parts I-III) 32 ILM (1993) 612 (Parts III-VI), Art. 1139; 
Joy Mining v. Arab Republic of Egypt (n 22) paras. 57-58; OECD, Definition of Investment and 
Investor in International Investment Agreements (2008) 50.  
46 Paul Szasz, ‘A Practical Guide to the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes’, (1968) 1 
Cornell International Law Journal 1, 15; William Rand, Robert N. Hornick and Paul Friedland, 
‘ICSID’s Emerging Jurisprudence: The Scope of ICSID’s Jurisdiction’, (1986) 19 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 33, 36; UNCTAD, Scope and Definition (1999) 
20; Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (n 5) 139; Raymond Doak Bishop, James R. 
Crawford and William M. Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary 
(Kluwer International 2005) 344; Rudolph Dolzer and Cristoph Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (OUP 2008) 60. 
47 Global Trading and Globex v. Ukraine (n 44) paras. 54-56. 
48 Ibid, para 56 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
49 Petrobart Ltd v Kyrgyz Republic, SCC Arbitration Institute Arbitration No. 126/2003 (Award, 29 
March 2005) <http://www.asil.org/pdfs/Petrobart-Kyrgyz.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012. 
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an investment would not exist if examined by an ICSID tribunal applying Fedax and 
Salini.50  
The reasoning in the above cases, which should be supported, is not only relevant 
because it clearly prohibits using ICSID for the purposes of commercial arbitration. 
It is also relevant because it contains useful starting points in determining which 
sales contracts actually should be investments for the purposes of Article 25(1). And 
this is a very interesting issue that (bearing in mind the vast number of sales 
contracts being concluded and performed every day around the world) deserves 
careful consideration. 
 
3.2 Sales Contracts which Deserve Recognition 
 
Apart from looking at the case law, it is also useful to carefully examine what legal 
scholars have to say about transactions that should not be considered investments in 
any case. Here we find such notions as ‘non-recurring transactions such as simple 
sales (...)’51, ‘ordinary transaction for purposes of a sale (...)’52 and ‘ordinary sales (...) 
unless some special feature of the transaction could objectively support a subjective 
stipulation by the parties to that effect.’53 Thus, both case law and doctrine point in 
the same direction - there needs to exist something special, something that would 
elevate the contract of sale to something more than just ‘ordinary’ or ‘simple’ one in 
order for an investment to exist. 
In the author’s opinion, that special element should be the complexity of the 
transaction combined with its firm relation to an existing investment in the host 
State. It is clear that simple trans-boundary sales have no place here. Not only that 
the case law clearly shows why the rejection of such contracts is justified in the 
context of Article 25(1), even regardless of the exact objective test one can use, but 
even establishing consent can easily prove to be an insurmountable obstacle for the 
claimant. For example, BITs usually speak of investments made in the territory of the 
host State.54 A claimant who is trying to prove that a trans-boundary commercial 
sale has any meaningful relation with the territory of the host State would indeed be 
highly unlikely to succeed, even if it can at somehow subsume this transaction into 
some broader notion of ‘contractual rights’ as potentially found in a BIT.    
But let us now turn to a different situation. For example, a foreign investor 
establishes a production facility in the host State. It might be, let us say, a 
pharmaceuticals producer aiming at supplying the host State health system, or using 
some advantages of the business climate in the host State to use it as a base for 
exporting its products. There should be no difficulty in finding that the production 
facility is an investment. But what should be the status of sales contracts concluded 
by the foreign investor to market the products of the facility? 
                                                 
50 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (n 14) 170. 
51 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (n 5) 139. 
52 Rudolph Dolzer, ‘The Notion of Investment in Recent Practice’, in Steve Charnovitz et al (eds), 
Law in the Service of Human Dignity: Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano (CUP 2005) 261, 
263. 
53 Szasz (n 46) 15. 
54 Douglas (n 27) 171-2; Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The 
Search for a Grand Bargain’, in Norbert Horn and Stefan M. Kröll (eds), Arbitrating Foreign 
Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International 2004) 51, 
68-9.  
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From the outset the situation seems to be different from the one involving trans-
boundary contracts. The potential territoriality criterion should no longer be an 
obstacle in framing the transaction within the BIT definition of an investment. What 
is more, many BITs include the example of a ‘claim associated with an investment’ in 
their illustrative lists of potential investments. It is quite conceivable that the 
claimant could here find strong support in proving that the BIT covers its 
transaction, and thus provides necessary consent for arbitration.  
But this still leaves the second step. There must be certain duration, risk, and 
contribution by the claimant.55 It can safely be stated that an individual, one-off 
transaction should remain out of the scope of investment protection even in these 
factual circumstances. Its duration is still practically negligible in the context of 
investments. That can also be said about the assumed risk. Even with a flexible 
mindset that a tribunal should assume, simple sales which were thrown out through 
the door regarding pure trans-boundary sales should in any case not be allowed to 
come back through the window in this different context. 
However, the situation should change once the transaction under scrutiny becomes 
significantly more complex, despite remaining in its essence a sales contract. An 
example of such a transaction is a high-value, long-term supply contract. In the 
example of a pharmaceutical company, this can mean supplying medicines to the 
health system of the host State for a number of years. It would involve a large 
number of recurring transactions under the general umbrella of a contractual 
framework. It is submitted that in such circumstances the test to be used in the 
second step of establishing jurisdiction can indeed be satisfied.   
Bearing in mind the specific circumstances of a factual situation as presented (and 
more on that will be said below), the three criteria can be fulfilled to such an extent 
that it can be hard to see how not to regard a contract as an investment. What if this 
long-term contract was actually a key motive for the foreign investor to come to the 
host State in the first place? If the contract fails because the host State breached 
standards of protection prescribed in the BIT, it is not only that the risk of losing 
the profit from that particular contract materialized, it is also possible that there is 
the risk that the whole initial, primary investment is now at stake. Similarly, when 
discussing contribution, it is not only that the investor contributed, let us say, a 
particular quantity of goods to fulfil a particular contract, but in a sense it 
‘contributed’ the whole initial investment, which was made exactly to contribute to 
fulfilling the contract. But even if the contract is not crucial in the sense indicated 
above, it should be sufficient to show that the three criteria are fully fulfilled and that 
the contract can be readily distinguished from ordinary contracts as described in 
Global Trade and Globex v. Ukraine or Joy Mining v. Egypt.  
This is especially true if one takes into account, as the tribunal should, a special 
circumstance which exists here, and that is the close connection of the transaction 
with a recognized investment. This is an excellent example of a situation where the 
concept described as ‘general unity of an investment operation’56 comes into play. 
This concept is based on a premise that an overall project may qualify as an 
                                                 
55 An excellent example of ‘pure’ sale of pharmaceuticals which failed to satisfy these elements 
(despite long duration and recurrent transactions) and was thus not found to be an investment can be 
found in The Republic of Italy v. The Republic of Cuba, Italy-Cuba BIT Ad Hoc Arbitration (Final 
Award,15 June 2008), < http://italaw.com/documents/Italy_v_Cuba_FinalAward2008.pdf> accessed 
15 May 2012, paras 212-21. 
56 UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (2007) 21. 
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investment even though certain individual transactions comprising it do not, and 
that disputes arising out of these related transactions (even though they are not 
investments in themselves) still can be seen as arising out of an investment.57 
Reasoning of the CSOB tribunal explains this well:  
 
Hence, a dispute that is brought before the Centre must be deemed to arise 
directly out of an investment even when it is based on a transaction which, 
standing alone, would not qualify as an investment under the Convention, 
provided that the particular transaction forms an integral part of an overall 
operation that qualifies as an investment.58  
 
It should be noted that non-ICSID cases also support such a conclusion. For 
example, in the Franz Sedelmayer59 case it was emphasized that it was the close 
relation to an already existing investment that was crucial in determining whether 
some other right was an investment too.60  
Therefore, the claimant has a strong additional argument that the contract, in 
essence, ‘emanates’ from an established investment and that this primary investment 
serves as a ‘leverage’ to propel it into the scope of protected investments.  
Of course, despite establishing a possible theoretical model for recognition of such 
sales contracts as investments, it is impossible in advance to define sufficient 
duration or sufficient risk, or sufficient level of complexity to differentiate simple 
from complex transactions. What should also be borne in mind is that different 
branches of industry operate in different conditions. It can well be the case that the 
manufacturer will not have a long term, well-defined contractual arrangement. 
Instead, it might have to rely on sales which are occasional and far apart, but of very 
high value and of crucial importance for its business. Is there still an investment if 
such an isolated sales contract comes under scrutiny of an arbitral tribunal? Can 
high value and importance be that special element that will differentiate it from an 
‘ordinary’ sale? It is hard to answer in abstract terms. This illustrates how tribunals 
can face truly hard cases in practice. But the general approach should remain the 
same. 
In conclusion, when dealing with sales contracts, arbitral tribunal should remain 
committed to the prevailing approach that ordinary commercial sales are not 
investments for the purpose of Article 25(1). But this should not be the general 
conclusion for all sales transactions. It should be qualified with an exception that 
more complex and longer lasting transactions associated with existing recognized 
investments warrant recognition as investments themselves.  
  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
                                                 
57 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (n 5) 141. 
58 CSOB v Slovakia (n 18) para 72.  
59 Franz Sedelmayer v Russian Federation, Germany-Russia BIT Ad Hoc Arbitration (Award, 7 July 
1998) <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/sedelmayer-russia.pdf> accessed 15 May 2012. 
60 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (n 14) 168. 
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The issues analysed in this paper show that the topic of contractual rights in 
investment law is a dynamic one. In dealing with these rights in arbitral practice 
what should be sought is an adequate balance between flexibility and predictability. 
It is thus useful to propose certain guidelines for the future that should help in 
achieving such aim. Some of these are of a more general nature, while some deal with 
particular groups of issues examined above. 
Two general remarks seem warranted. Firstly, the divergence in the ICSID 
jurisprudence regarding very important issues of jurisdiction is a reason for serious 
concern. While achieving uniformity of practice through introducing binding 
precedents is hardly practically feasible, or even desirable, ICSID tribunals should be 
aware of their role in remedying this situation. Striving for uniformity in a 
reasonable manner should be the aim pursued in practice. Secondly, arbitrators 
dealing with contractual rights as potential investments should keep an open mind 
and be receptive to the ever changing forms in which foreign investments take place. 
The historical development of the notion of investment is a good illustration how 
flexible this area can be. But this open-mindedness is also warranted by the very 
essence of the idea of investment protection. Excessive restrictiveness can only 
lower the incentives for investing and in that way infringe the main goal – economic 
development.  
As for recognizing which contracts are investments, apart from further 
harmonization of definitions in legal instruments which would certainly be 
beneficial, the way forward seems to be in accepting a common approach for 
determination if the conditions found in Article 25(1) are fulfilled. The approach that 
should be accepted is based on distinction between establishing consent (to be found 
in a BIT) and establishing if there is an investment, as both are distinctly required 
by Article 25(1). While the first issue remains largely in the area of general treaty 
interpretation, more guidelines can be given for the second element. The test to be 
applied should be based on the criteria of duration, risk and contribution. These 
should be fulfilled to a sufficient extent in every case, cumulatively, but the tribunal 
should be free to determine what the sufficient extent is. In committing this 
balancing exercise, it should pay attention to the specific circumstances of each 
particular case.  
Regarding sales contracts, the existing general view that ordinary sales are not 
investments for the purpose of Article 25 should remain predominant. But this 
reasoning cannot be extended to all sales contracts. When a sales contract (which is, 
as the first condition, protected under the BIT) forms a part of a broader investment 
enterprise, clustered around a recognized investment, and by its other features also 
complies with the established test for recognition under Article 25(1), then it should 
be considered to be an investment and protected accordingly.  
It is, of course, not easy to achieve the observance of these guidelines in practice. But 
it is something to be aimed for. It is the author’s opinion that application of the 
above guidelines would promote fair, balanced and reasonably predictable outcomes 
in deciding various issues that come before investment arbitration tribunals. And 
such outcomes would increase the protection of both legal and economic interests of 
investors and host States. 
